The Golden Age of Oligarchy? Institutional Constraints and Leadership Discretion in Chinaís Cadre Management System.

authoritarianism;institutions;power-sharing;China;Political Science;Social Sciences;Political Science

Zeng, QingjieKollman, Kenneth W. ;

University of Michigan

关键词: authoritarianism;    institutions;    power-sharing;    China;    Political Science;    Social Sciences;    Political Science;   

Others  :  https://deepblue.lib.umich.edu/bitstream/handle/2027.42/113384/qingjie_1.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y

瑞士|英语

来源: The Illinois Digital Environment for Access to Learning and Scholarship

【 摘 要 】

Many authoritarian regimes in the modern era vest power in a collective governing body to prevent the emergence of personalist dictatorship. In these regimes, the maintenance of cohesion and unity among the ruling oligarchs is of first-order importance for the long-term resilience of authoritarianism. This dissertation suggests a typology of authoritarian rule based on the distribution of power among the first tier elites and their interaction with second tier followers. The specific institutional formula adopted derives in part from the regime’s attempts to cope with three common threats to oligarchic rule: personalization, demagoguery, and stagnation. I apply this analytic framework to contemporary China, arguing that the institutional arrangements in the CCP polity combine personalistic and collective features in first-tier interaction while ruling out reciprocal accountability between the two tiers. On the basis of this characterization, I put forward several observable implications for the operation of China’s cadre management system, which regulates the appointment and removal of public officials. These hypotheses are tested against empirical data, generating evidence to support the following propositions: 1>. the wielding of power within the oligarchy is constrained by institutional rules of power-sharing; 2>. the paramount leader is still provided with enough formal and informal resources to launch initiatives and avoid policy gridlock; 3>. relations between the two tiers of leaders are hierarchical, as the second tier followers are deprived of any meaningful impact on personnel and policy decisions. While it is difficult to predict whether the CCP regime will be blessed with another long spell of economic growth and political stability, the two-and-a-half decades following the Tiananmen crisis provides a vivid example of how elite cohesiveness is sustained by sophisticated power arrangements.