Resource Allocation in Decentralized Systems with Strategic Agents: An Implementation Theory Approach.

Strategic Users;Mechanism Design;Markets;Public Goods;Nash Equilibrium.;Electrical Engineering;Engineering;Electrical Engineering-Systems

Kakhbod, AliOzdaglar, Asuman ;

University of Michigan

关键词: Strategic Users;    Mechanism Design;    Markets;    Public Goods;    Nash Equilibrium.;    Electrical Engineering;    Engineering;    Electrical Engineering-Systems;   

Others  :  https://deepblue.lib.umich.edu/bitstream/handle/2027.42/96062/akakhbod_1.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y

瑞士|英语

来源: The Illinois Digital Environment for Access to Learning and Scholarship

【 摘 要 】

In this thesis we present an implementation theory approach to decentralized resource allocation problems with strategic users/agents in communication networks. For wired networks we study the unicast and multi-rate multicast service provisioning problem. For wireless networks we study the problem of power allocation and spectrum sharing where each user;;s transmissions create interference to all (or subset of) network users.We formulate the unicast service provisioning problem as a market allocation problem, the power allocation and spectrum sharing problem as a public goods allocation problem, and the multi-rate multicast service provisioning problem as the combination of a market and a public goods allocation problems.For unicast and multi-rate multicast service provisioning we develop game forms/mechanisms that possess the following properties. (P1) The allocations corresponding to all Nash equilibria (NE) of the games induced by the mechanisms are optimal solutions of the corresponding centralized allocation problems where the objective is the maximization of the sum of the users;; utilities. (P2) The strategic users voluntarily participate in the allocation process. (P3) The budget is balanced at the allocations corresponding to all NE of the game induced by the mechanism as well as at all other feasible allocations. For the power allocation and spectrum sharing problem we develop a game form/mechanism that possesses properties (P2) and (P3) above along with the following property. (P4) The allocations corresponding to all NE of the game induced by the mechanism are Pareto optimal.