Internal Threat Alliances: Great Powers, Fragmented Allies, and Alliance-Making in the Post-Cold War Era

International relations;alliances;alignment theory;U.S. foreign policy;international relations theory;International Studies

Quirk, Patrick W.David, Steven R. ;

Johns Hopkins University

关键词: International relations;    alliances;    alignment theory;    U.S. foreign policy;    international relations theory;    International Studies;   

Others  :  https://jscholarship.library.jhu.edu/bitstream/handle/1774.2/37997/QUIRK-DISSERTATION-2014.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y

瑞士|英语

来源: JOHNS HOPKINS DSpace Repository

【 摘 要 】

International relations (IR) theory on alliances traditionally focuses on how and why states balance (resist) or bandwagon with (appease) external threats.But most threats faced by states today are not from other states. Rather, they come from within the states themselves in the form of civil war, rebellions, insurgencies and coups. Faced with threats emanating from within weak polities, great powers and the regimes ruling such peripheral states have brought their security policies into close cooperation and formed military alliances to quell the political violence or consequences thereof. The weak state’s leaders are motivated to make sure they remain in power, while the great power seeks to safeguard its interests associated therewith. These ;;internal threat alliances” differ fundamentally from those in which states align to balance a threat external to their borders (what I refer to as ;;external threat alliances”) but have not been adequately examined in the literature.To help fill this gap in IR theory, this dissertation explains four of these core differences and how they affect the behavior of both the threatened state (regime) and its prospective alliance partner. In so doing, the dissertation provides a framework of mid-range, contingent theoretical generalizations for understanding and explaining the more common type of alliance today. These core differences are the following. First, rather than balancing an external enemy in order to safeguard state security and territorial integrity, the great power/regime align in response to severe internal threats and to safeguard the regime’s survival and great power interests associated therewith. Second, instead of comprising two essentially cohesive actors with control over their alliance-relevant actors (the military, for example) that act to advance core national interests, the great power aligns with an extremely internally fragmented ally whose relevant actors/agencies often decide to advance their own interests over alliance goals and the national interest. Third, rather than the either/or relationship between balancing and bandwagoning in traditional alliances, some regime agencies balance the target threat while others simultaneously collude with the same set of actors. And fourth and finally, when deciding how to respond to threats the regime largely does not do what is best for their countries’ national interest—as is the case with traditional military alliances—but, instead, takes those actions that would preserve their political and personal power. The dissertation establishes this argument by employing a qualitative case study research methodology to examine two such internal threat alliances: the U.S. and Colombia (1980-2010) and the U.S. and Afghanistan (2001-2012). This included fieldwork and interviews in Colombia and Afghanistan. The dissertation is important in illustrating how the nature of alliance making has changed and for guiding policy given that great powers will be called upon to make this form of alliance in the future just as they are involved with them today.