INTELLIGENCE OVERSIGHT:NATIONAL SECURITY HANGING IN THE BALANCE OFLEGISLATIVE INCENTIVES AND PUBLIC OPINION

oversight;intelligence;Global Security Studies

Hoang, Amanda MaeWolfson, Dorothea I. ;

Johns Hopkins University

关键词: oversight;    intelligence;    Global Security Studies;   

Others  :  https://jscholarship.library.jhu.edu/bitstream/handle/1774.2/37251/HOANG-THESIS-2014.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y

瑞士|英语

来源: JOHNS HOPKINS DSpace Repository

【 摘 要 】

Due to the classified nature of U.S. national security programs, Congress’ constitutional responsibly to conduct oversight of the Intelligence Community (IC) is of prime importance. In 2013, Edward Snowden leaked thousands of classified documents regarding the National Security Administration’s programs to media outlets and governments worldwide. Snowden’s actions, coupled with growing concerns regarding citizen’s privacy rights and U.S. national security programs, brought oversight of the IC once again to the forefront of the policy debate. However, the questionable success of America’s intelligence oversight process is not a new issue. Key players in the policy debate, including scholars, leaders in the IC, and members of Congress concur that the current intelligence oversight system is dysfunctional and in need of reform. This thesis reviews the historical foundation for the intelligence committees and examines the policy process since 2001 using historical, qualitative and quantitative data to prove congressional oversight increased and shifted in focus. In addition, this work affirms that the relationship between the Intelligence agencies and Capitol Hill remains in disarray due to: overlapping committee jurisdiction, the lack of legislative incentives, and expertise at the committee level. Lastly, this work calls for members the policy debate to focus on achieving a comprehensive solution that will ensure the legitimacy of the IC and ultimately, the preservation of America’s national security.