Privatization and Labor ForceRestructuring around the World

Chong, Alberto ; Ló ; pez-de-Silanes, Florencio

World Bank, Washington, DC

关键词: ACCOUNTING;    ADVERSE SELECTION;    ASSETS;    ASYMMETRIC INFORMATION;    BANK PRIVATIZATION;   

DOI  :  10.1596/1813-9450-2884
RP-ID  :  WPS2884

学科分类：社会科学、人文和艺术（综合）

来源: World Bank Open Knowledge Repository

【 摘 要 】

Some critics of privatization argue thatpoor labor force restructuring is a key concern and thatgovernments should establish better retrenchment programs.Using new data from a sample of 400 companies in the world,Chong and López-de-Silanes test competing theories about thewisdom of retrenchment programs and their effect on pricespaid by buyers, and rehiring policies by private ownersafter privatization. The results show that adverse selectionplagues retrenchment programs carried out by governmentsbefore privatization. Controlling for endogeneity, severallabor retrenchment policies yield a negative impact on netprivatization prices. In confirmation of the adverseselection argument, various types of voluntary downsizinglead to a higher frequency of rehiring of the same workersby the new private owners. Compulsory skill-based programsare the only type of program that is marginally associatedwith higher prices and lower rehiring rates afterprivatization, but the political and economic costs of thispolicy may make it somewhat impractical. While a qualifiednon-intervention policy appears to be the safest bet inlabor retrenchment before privatization, another one mightbe to set up a social safety net or labor reallocationprogram before privatization, and then let the new privateowners decide who is redundant and who is not. Setting upthe program before privatization may help with the politicalviability of the process and letting the new owners managethe retrenchment may help avoid adverse selection.