The Political Economy of Fiscal Policy and Economic Management in Oil Exporting Countries

Eifert, Benn ; Gelb, Alan ; Borje Tallroth, Nils

World Bank, Washington, DC

关键词: AGGREGATE DEMAND;    AGRICULTURE;    ALTERNATIVE INVESTMENTS;    AUTHORITY;    BORROWING;   

DOI  :  10.1596/1813-9450-2899
RP-ID  :  WPS2899

学科分类：社会科学、人文和艺术（综合）

来源: World Bank Open Knowledge Repository

【 摘 要 】

Despite massive oil rent incomes sincethe early 1970s, the economic performance of oil-exportingcountries-with notable exceptions-is poor. While there isextensive literature on the management of oil resources,analysis of the underlying political determinants of thispoor performance is more sparse. Drawing on concepts fromthe comparative institutionalist tradition in politicalscience, the authors develop a generalized typology ofpolitical states that is used in analyzing the politicaleconomy of fiscal and economic management in oil-exportingcountries with widely differing political systems. Inassessing performance, the authors focus on issues oflong-term savings, economic stabilization, and efficient useof oil rents. The comparisons of country experiences suggestthat countries with strong, mature, democratic traditionshave advantages in managing oil rents well because of theirability to reach consensus, their educated and informedelectorates, and a high level of transparency thatfacilitates clear decisions on how to use rents over a longhorizon. Yet even these systems, ensuring cautious use ofoil income is a continuing struggle. Traditional andmodernizing autocracies have also demonstrated their abilityto sustain long decision horizons and implementdevelopmental policies. But resistance to transparency andthe danger of oil-led spending and expenditure commitmentsbecoming the major legitimizing force behind the state maypose risk to the long-term sustainability of their currentdevelopment strategies. In contrast, little positive effectcan be expected from the politically unstable, predatoryautocracies, which typically have very short policy horizonsand sometimes the characteristics of "rovingbandit" regimes. Factional democracies, with weakpolitical parties and highly personalized politics, presentparticular challenges because they lack a sufficientlyeffective political system to create a consensus amongstrong competing interests. Special attention will be neededto increase transparency and raise public awareness in thesecountries. And oil rent makes it more difficult to sustain aconstituency in favor of sound, longer-run economicmanagement because it weakens incentives for agents tosupport checks and balances that impinge on their individualplans to appropriate the rents. The country comparisonsfurther demonstrate that technical solutions-such as theestablishment of oil stabilization funds and budgetaryreforms-to enhance transparency and efficiency in the use ofoil rents will not work well unless constituencies can bedeveloped in support of such measures.