Renegotiation of Concession Contracts in Latin America

Guasch, J. Luis ; Laffont, Jean-Jacques ; Straub, Stephane

World Bank, Washington, DC

关键词: ACCOUNTING;    ADVERSE SELECTION;    AIRPORTS;    APPROPRIATE TECHNOLOGY;    ARBITRATION;   

DOI  :  10.1596/1813-9450-3011
RP-ID  :  WPS3011

学科分类：社会科学、人文和艺术（综合）

来源: World Bank Open Knowledge Repository

【 摘 要 】

The authors construct a regulation modelin which renegotiation occurs due to the imperfectenforcement of concession contracts. This enables theauthors to provide theoretical predictions for the impact onthe probability of renegotiation of a concession, regulatoryinstitutions, institutional features, economic shocks, andthe characteristics of the concession contracts. Then theyuse a data set of nearly 1,000 concessions awarded in LatinAmerica and the Caribbean countries from 1989 to 2000covering the sectors of telecommunications, energy,transport, and water to test these predictions. Finally, theauthors derive some policy implications of their theoreticaland empirical work.