The note looks at effectiveanticorruption legal instruments. However, law enforcementmeasures are not the first or necessarily the preferredmethod of defense. An informed citizenry, a governmentimbued with a service ethic, and other measures can be moreeffective in combating corruption. But tailoring the law toimprove enforcement capacity generally encompasses a varietyof statutes that prohibit bribery, nepotism, conflicts ofinterest, and favoritism in the award of contract or theprovision of government benefits. And writing such lawscontaining "bright-line rules" in contrast tothose containing standards open to interpretation byenforcement agencies may make it easier to monitorcompliance and enforcement, but also rob the law offlexibility. Such laws often must be simplified to the pointof arbitrariness-making them harder to accept thanbroadly-worded standards, which often conform to intuitivesocial understandings. The cost of bright-line rules areoften more than offset by their deterrence value and theirvalue in facilitating monitoring in countries with weakenforcement agencies. However, no statute can avoid someopen-textured provisions. When a section in ananticorruption law must leave something open to question,one way to reduce enforcers' discretion is to establisha procedure for obtaining advance rulings. Finally, theauthor recommends laws that help bring corruption to light,such as a freedom of information law.