Should Credit Be Given for Autonomous Liberalization in Multilateral Trade Negotiations?

Mattoo, Aaditya ; Olarreaga, Marcelo

World Bank, Washington, DC

关键词: AGRICULTURE;    APPLIED TARIFF;    ASSURANCE;    AVERAGE TARIFF;    AVERAGE TARIFFS;   

DOI  :  10.1596/1813-9450-2374
RP-ID  :  WPS2374

学科分类：社会科学、人文和艺术（综合）

来源: World Bank Open Knowledge Repository

【 摘 要 】

As each new round of multilateral tradenegotiations approaches, there is a demand for a negotiatingrule that would give credit for autonomous (unilateral)liberalization. The authors show that the feasibility, anddesirability of such a rule depend on when it is instituted.A credit rule established at the beginning of a round ofnegotiations has a primarily distributional effect, favoringthose who have already undertaken liberalization.Implementing such a rule would depend on the generosity ofthose who have not liberalized. The authors propose insteadestablishing a credit rule at the end of a round ofnegotiations, which creates an ex-ante assurance that anyunilateral liberalization will receive credit in the nextround. Such a rule would help induce, or enhanceliberalization in some countries between negotiating rounds,by reducing the gains from retaining protection asnegotiating currency. More strikingly, it could also lead todeeper levels of multilateral liberalization, and induceother countries to go further than they would in the absenceof a rule. Most important, such an ex-ante rule would notrely on altruism to be generally acceptable.