科技报告详细信息
| Bidding for Concessions : The Impact of Contract Design | |
| Klein, Michael | |
| World Bank, Washington, DC | |
| 关键词: CONCESSIONS; INFRASTRUCTURE; CONTRACT NEGOTIATION; RISKS; COST SHARING; | |
| RP-ID : 18718 | |
| 学科分类:社会科学、人文和艺术(综合) | |
| 来源: World Bank Open Knowledge Repository | |
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【 摘 要 】
Infrastructure concession contracts setout the performance obligations and rights ofconcessionaires and the incentives and risks under whichthey operate, including pricing arrangements. The claritywith which these terms can be defined determines whetherthere is likely to be renegotiations after contract award,which may undermine the significance of the initial auction.The design of incentives and risk allocation will affectfirst the intensity of competition and then thesustainability of the original contract. This Note examinesthese issues.
【 预 览 】
| Files | Size | Format | View |
|---|---|---|---|
| multi_page.pdf | 1744KB |
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