The Political Economy of Healthcare Litigation : Model and Empirical Application to Uruguay

Corduneanu-Huci, Cristina ; Hamilton, Alexander ; Masses-Ferrer, Issel

关键词: ACCESS TO HEALTH CARE;    ACCESS TO HEALTH SERVICES;    AGGRESSIVE;    ALLOCATION OF RESOURCES;    BUDGET CONSTRAINTS;   

DOI  :  10.1596/1813-9450-5821
RP-ID  :  WPS5821

学科分类：社会科学、人文和艺术（综合）

来源: World Bank Open Knowledge Repository

【 摘 要 】

The political economy of health care iscomplex, as stakeholders have conflicting preferences overefficiency and equity. This paper formally models thepreferences of consumer and producer groups involved inpriority setting and judicialization in public health care.It uses a unique dataset of stakeholder perceptions, fromUruguay, to test whether these hypotheses are consistentwith empirical evidence. The results suggest that theexpectations of the political economy literature aresupported: 1) regulators of public healthcare are lessconcerned with efficiency considerations than consumers; and2) less organized groups are more concerned about equitythan more organized interest groups. With respect to theconsequences of health litigation, the findings are onlypartially consistent with the health care governanceliterature. Consumers perceive litigation as more beneficialthan health care providers and regulators do.Counter-intuitively, powerful interest groups seem lesswilling to use litigation to shape policy outcomes.