Incentive Contracts for Environmental Services and Their Potential in REDD

Fortmann, Lea ; Cordero, Paula ; Sohngen, Brent ; Roe, Brian

World Bank, Washington, DC

关键词: ABATEMENT;    ABATEMENT COSTS;    ACCOUNTING;    ADVERSE SELECTION;    AFFORESTATION;   

DOI  :  10.1596/1813-9450-6829
RP-ID  :  WPS6829

学科分类：社会科学、人文和艺术（综合）

来源: World Bank Open Knowledge Repository

【 摘 要 】

Implementation arrangements for ReducingGreenhouse Gas Emissions from Deforestation and ForestDegradation can be seen as contracts that could address someof the inherent problems with forest carbon credits thatoften lead to high transaction costs -- measuring,monitoring, and verification. Self-enforcing contracts,where it is in the best interest of the environmentalservice providers to comply with the contracts, may be oneway to reduce these costs if providers have incentives touphold their end of the contract. While the literature onReducing Greenhouse Gas Emissions from Deforestation andForest Degradation is extensive, there is little informationavailable to guide policy makers or investors on what formsuch contracts should take. After providing an overview ofthe current status of Reducing Greenhouse Gas Emissions fromDeforestation and Forest Degradation and its role as a toolfor reducing carbon emissions on an international scale, thepaper describes key issues regarding implementation andreviews the literature on contracts from the related area ofPayments for Ecosystem Services programs, which face similarchallenges. The remainder of the paper reviews variouscontractual mechanisms from agricultural and forestryrelated projects that have been proposed or are being usedin practice and discusses the various implicationsassociated with their design and implementation.