Dealing with Politics for Money and Power in Infrastructure

Benitez, Daniel ; Estache, Antonio ; Soreide, Tina

关键词: ACCESS TO INFORMATION;    ACCOUNTABILITY;    ACCOUNTING;    AIRPORTS;    ALLOCATION OF RESOURCES;   

DOI  :  10.1596/1813-9450-5455
RP-ID  :  WPS5455

学科分类：社会科学、人文和艺术（综合）

来源: World Bank Open Knowledge Repository

【 摘 要 】

Policy recommendations forinfrastructure provision usually build on a well-establishedunderstanding of best practice for sector governance. Toorarely are they adapted to the country-specific politicalenvironment even if this is an area where policy choices arelikely to be subject to private agendas in politics. Thefact that such private agendas are often ignored goes a longway toward explaining why infrastructure policies fail andwhy best practice can be counterproductive. Whilenon-benevolence and rent-seeking are well described in theliterature and anecdotes abound, there is only limitedconsideration of how the different incentive problems inpolitics impede policy improvements in infrastructure. Thispaper addresses why politics in infrastructure cannot beignored, drawing on theoretical results and a systematicreview of experiences. It reviews how different privateagendas in politics will have different impacts forsector-governance decisions -- and hence service delivery.The concept of best practice in policy recommendationsshould be reconsidered in a wide perspective and allow fortailored solutions based on an understanding of the givenincentive problems. Policy recommendations should take intoaccount how coordination trade-offs may complicate effortsto reduce the possible impact of private agendas oninfrastructure policy decisions. Although more transparencylinked to service delivery indicators is a "safe"recommendation, it is also clear that the demand for goodgovernance will not be sufficient to secure politicalaccountability in a sector with huge vested interestscombined with complicated funding schemes and complex contracts.