How Business Community Institutions Can Help Fight Corruption

Dixit, Avinash

World Bank, Washington, DC

关键词: ACCOUNTING;    ADJUDICATION;    ANTI-CORRUPTION;    ANTICORRUPTION;    ANTICORRUPTION AGENCIES;   

DOI  :  10.1596/1813-9450-6954
RP-ID  :  WPS6954

学科分类：社会科学、人文和艺术（综合）

来源: World Bank Open Knowledge Repository

【 摘 要 】

This paper considers the possibility ofcollective action by the business community to countercorruption in the award of government licenses andcontracts. The analogy is with contract enforcementinstitutions studied by economic historians and contract lawscholars. The institution in this context comprises ano-bribery norm, a community system to detect violations,and a multilateral ostracism penalty upon conviction in acommunity tribunal. The requirements such an institutionmust meet if it is to be effective are analyzed. It is shownthat an institution of sufficient quality -- combiningprobability of correct detection and severity of punishment-- can eliminate bribery. If the private institution is notsufficiently good, then in conjunction with the state'sformal apparatus it reduces the level of bribes demanded,but increases the probability of winning the license orcontract through bribery. An improvement in thegovernment's formal anti-corruption mechanism, holdingthe private institution constant, reduces both the level ofbribes and the probability of success through bribery. Thetwo institutions together are shown to achieve substantiallybetter outcomes than either can on its own.