Regulation, Renegotiation and Capital Structure : Theory and Evidence from Latin American Transport Concessions

Moore, Alexander ; Straub, Sté ; phane ; Dethier, Jean-Jacques

World Bank, Washington, DC

关键词: AMOUNT OF DEBT;    BAILOUTS;    BANK POLICY;    BANKRUPT;    BANKRUPTCY;   

DOI  :  10.1596/1813-9450-6646
RP-ID  :  WPS6646

学科分类：社会科学、人文和艺术（综合）

来源: World Bank Open Knowledge Repository

【 摘 要 】

The paper examines the capital structureof regulated infrastructure firms. The authors develop amodel showing that leverage, the ratio of liabilities toassets, is lower under high-powered regulation and thatfirms operating under high-powered regulation makeproportionally larger reductions in leverage when the costof debt increases. They test the predictions of the modelusing an original panel dataset of 124 transport concessionsin Brazil, Chile, Colombia and Peru over 1992-2011, findingbroad support for our predictions.