Corruption and Productivity : Firm-level Evidence from the BEEPS Survey

De Rosa, Donato ; Gooroochurn, Nishaal ; Gorg, Holger

关键词: ABUSES;    ADVERSE EFFECTS;    ASSETS;    BRIBE;    BRIBERY;   

DOI  :  10.1596/1813-9450-5348
RP-ID  :  WPS5348

学科分类：社会科学、人文和艺术（综合）

来源: World Bank Open Knowledge Repository

【 摘 要 】

Using enterprise data for the economiesof Central and Eastern Europe and the CIS, this studyexamines the effects of corruption on productivity.Corruption is narrowly defined as the occurrence of informalpayments to government officials to ease the day-to-dayoperation of firms. The effects of this "bribetax" on productivity are compared to the consequencesof red tape, which may be understood as imposing a"time tax" on firms. When testing effects in thefull sample, only the bribe tax appears to have a negativeimpact on firm-level productivity, while the effect of thetime tax is insignificant. At the same time, unlike similarstudies using country-level data, firm level analysis allowsa direct test of the "efficient grease" hypothesisby investigating whether corruption may increaseproductivity by helping reduce the time tax on firms.Results provide no evidence of a trade-off between the timeand the bribe taxes, implying that bribing does not emergeas a second-best option to achieve higher productivity byhelping circumvent cumbersome bureaucratic requirements.When controlling for EU membership the effects of the bribetax are more harmful in non-EU countries. This suggests thatthe surrounding environment influences the way in which firmbehaviour affects firm performance. In particular, incountries where corruption is more prevalent and the legalframework is weaker, bribery is more harmful for firm-level productivity.