Political Capture of Decentralization : Vote-Buying through Grants-Financed Local Jurisdictions

Khemani, Stuti

关键词: AFFILIATES;    ANTI-CORRUPTION;    AUDITING;    AUDITS;    AUTHORITY;   

DOI  :  10.1596/1813-9450-5350
RP-ID  :  WPS5350

学科分类：社会科学、人文和艺术（综合）

来源: World Bank Open Knowledge Repository

【 摘 要 】

A recent trend in decentralization inseveral large and diverse countries is the creation of localjurisdictions below the regional level -- municipalities,towns, and villages -- whose spending is almost exclusivelyfinanced by grants from both regional and nationalgovernments. This paper argues that such grants-financeddecentralization enables politicians to target benefits topivotal voters and organized interest groups in exchange forpolitical support. Decentralization, in this model, issubject to political capture, facilitating vote-buying,patronage, or pork-barrel projects, at the expense ofeffective provision of broad public goods. There isanecdotal evidence on local politics in several largecountries that is consistent with this theory. The paperexplores its implications for international developmentprograms in support of decentralization.