Does Cross-Listing Lead toFunctional Convergence? Empirical Evidence

Ayyagari, Meghana

World Bank, Washington, D.C.

关键词: AUDIT COMMITTEES;    BENCHMARK;    CAPITAL MARKETS;    COMPANY;    CONTROL SHARE;   

DOI  :  10.1596/1813-9450-3264
RP-ID  :  WPS3264

学科分类：社会科学、人文和艺术（综合）

来源: World Bank Open Knowledge Repository

【 摘 要 】

The author examines the effect of legalbonding on ownership and control structures of foreign firmscross-listing in the United States. Contrary to thepredictions of corporate governance convergence theories,there is little evidence of convergence-related migration toa dispersed ownership structure on cross-listing. She findsthat rather than as a means to change their governancestructure, foreign firms use American Depository Receipts asa vehicle to sell control blocks, often to a new foreignowner. Firms that cross-list and sell stakes to domesticowners are from large economies with high stock marketliquidity. In contrast, firm-level characteristics are moreimportant predictors of a control change to a foreign owner.Cross-listing firms that sell control blocks to foreignerstend to be smaller, have low levels of debt, and have a highforeign income growth rate. The post cross-listingperformance of firms that undergo a control change is alsodifferent from firms that do not experience a control change.