Enforcement and Corporate Governance

Berglö ; f, Erik ; Claessens, Stijn

World Bank, Washington, D.C.

关键词: ACTUAL COSTS;    ASSET STRIPPING;    ASSETS;    AUDITORS;    AUDITS;   

DOI  :  10.1596/1813-9450-3409
RP-ID  :  WPS3409

学科分类：社会科学、人文和艺术（综合）

来源: World Bank Open Knowledge Repository

【 摘 要 】

Enforcement more than regulations,laws-on-the-books, or voluntary codes is key to effectivecorporate governance, at least in transition and developingcountries. Corporate governance and enforcement mechanismsare intimately linked as they affect firms' ability tocommit to their stakeholders, in particular to externalinvestors. The authors provide a framework for understandingthese links and how they are shaped by countries'institutional contexts. When the general enforcementenvironment is weak and specific enforcement mechanismsfunction poorly, as in many developing and transitioncountries, few of the traditional corporate governancemechanisms are effective. The principal consequence in thesecountries is a large block-holder, but there are importantpotential costs to this mechanism. A range of private andpublic enforcement "tools" can help reduce thesecosts and reinforce other supplementary corporate governancemechanisms. The limited empirical evidence suggests thatprivate tools are more effective than public forms ofenforcement in the typical environment of most developingand transition countries. However, public enforcement isnecessary regardless, and private enforcement mechanismsoften require public laws to function. Furthermore, in somecountries at least, bottom-up, private-led tools precededand even shaped public laws. Political economy constraintsresulting from the intermingling of business and politics,however, often prevent improvements in the generalenforcement environment, and adoption and implementation ofpublic laws in these countries.