Avoiding Customer and TaxpayerBailouts in Private Infrastructure Projects: Policy towardLeverage, Risk Allocation, and Bankruptcy

Ehrhardt, David ; Irwin, Timothy

World Bank, Washington, D.C.

关键词: ACTUAL COSTS;    AIRPORTS;    ASSETS;    BANKRUPTCY;    BONDS;   

DOI  :  10.1596/1813-9450-3274
RP-ID  :  WPS3274

学科分类：社会科学、人文和艺术（综合）

来源: World Bank Open Knowledge Repository

【 摘 要 】

Many private infrastructure projects mixregulation that subjects the private company to considerablerisk, a government or regulator that is reluctant to see thecompany go bankrupt, and high leverage on the part of thecompany. If all goes well, equityholders make a profit,debtholders are repaid, customers pay no more than theyexpected, and the government is not called on to bail thecompany out. If all goes badly enough, however, the prospectof bankruptcy will loom. Unwilling to see the company gobankrupt, however, the regulator will have to permit anunscheduled price increase, or the government will have toinject taxpayers' money into the firm. In other words,the combination means customers and taxpayers bear more riskthan would appear from the regulations governing the privateinfrastructure project.The authors examine how theseproblems have played out in five cases. Then they describehow governments and regulators can quantify the extent ofthe problems and, using option-pricing techniques, value thecustomer and taxpayer guarantees involved. Finally, theauthors analyze three options for mitigating the problem:making bankruptcy a more credible threat, limiting theprivate operator's leverage, and reducing the privateoperator's exposure to risk.The authors conclude thatappropriate policy depends on the tax system, thefeasibility of enforcing bankruptcy, and the benefits ofrisk transfer from taxpayer to the private sector.