Donor Fragmentation andBureaucratic Quality in Aid Recipients

Knack, Stephen ; Rahman, Aminur

World Bank, Washington, D.C.

关键词: ADVERSE EFFECTS;    AID;    AID AGENCIES;    AID COORDINATION;    AID PROGRAMS;   

DOI  :  10.1596/1813-9450-3186
RP-ID  :  WPS3186

学科分类：社会科学、人文和艺术（综合）

来源: World Bank Open Knowledge Repository

【 摘 要 】

This paper analyzes the impact of donorfragmentation on the quality of government bureaucracy inaid-recipient nations. A formal model of a donor'sdecision to hire government administrators to managedonor-funded projects predicts that the number ofadministrators hired declines as the donor's share ofother projects in the country increases, and as thedonor's "altruism" (concern for the successof other donors' projects) increases. These hypothesesare supported by cross-country empirical tests using anindex of bureaucratic quality available for aid-recipientnations over the 1982-2001 period. Declines in bureaucraticquality are associated with higher donor fragmentation(reflecting the presence of many donors, each with a smallshare of aid), and with smaller shares of aid coming frommultilateral agencies, a proxy for donor "altruism."