Enforceability of Labor Law : Evidence from a Labor Court in Mexico

Kaplan, David S. ; Sadka, Joyce

World Bank, Washington, DC

关键词: ACCESS TO LEGAL SERVICES;    ACCURATE INFORMATION;    ACTIONS;    ADJUDICATION;    ADMINISTRATIVE COURTS;   

DOI  :  10.1596/1813-9450-4483
RP-ID  :  WPS4483

学科分类：社会科学、人文和艺术（综合）

来源: World Bank Open Knowledge Repository

【 摘 要 】

The authors analyze lawsuits involvingpublicly-appointed lawyers in a labor court in Mexico tostudy how a rigid law is enforced. They show that, evenafter a judge has awarded something to a worker allegingunjust dismissal, the award goes uncollected 56 percent ofthe time. Workers who are dismissed after working more thanseven years, however, do not leave these awards uncollectedbecause their legally-mandated severance payments arelarger. A simple theoretical model is used to generatepredictions on how lawsuit outcomes should depend on theinformation available to the worker and on the worker'scost of collecting an award after trial, both of which aredetermined in part by the worker's lawyer. Differencesin outcomes across lawyers are consistent with thehypothesis that firms take advantage both of workers who arepoorly informed and of workers who find it more costly tocollect an award after winning at trial.