Behavioral Economics and Public Sector Reform : An Accidental Experiment and Lessons from Cameroon

Raballand, Gaë ; l ; Rajaram, Anand

World Bank, Washington, DC

关键词: ACCOUNTABILITY;    ACCOUNTING;    ADMINISTRATIVE COST;    AUTHORITY;    AUTHORIZATION;   

DOI  :  10.1596/1813-9450-6595
RP-ID  :  WPS6595

学科分类：社会科学、人文和艺术（综合）

来源: World Bank Open Knowledge Repository

【 摘 要 】

Starting with the hypothesis thatbehaviors are the critical (and often overlooked) factor inpublic sector performance, this paper explores the notion ofhow behavioral change (and thus institutional change) mightbe better motivated in the public sector. The basis for thisstudy is "an accidental experiment" resulting fromthe World Bank's operational engagement in Cameroon. In2008, World Bank staff successfully concluded preparation ona project to support the Government of Cameroon to improvetransparency, efficiency, and accountability of publicfinance management. The US$15 million project supported anumber of ministries to strengthen a broad range ofmanagement systems and capacities. Independently andconcurrently, other Bank staff initiated a low-profile,technical assistance project to improve performance inCameroon's Customs, supported by a small tradefacilitation grant of approximately US$300,000. One approachappears to have succeeded in initiating change while theother has signally failed. The two projects of differentscale, scope and design in the samegovernance environmentoffer a very interesting natural experiment (unplanned butaccidental for that reason) that allows insights into thenature of institutional change and the role of behavior andincentives and approaches that offer greater prospects formaking reform possible. The paper confirms the value ofusing ideas from behavioral economics, both to designinstitutional reforms and to critically assess the approachto institutional reform taken by development agencies suchas the World Bank.