Insurgency and Credible Commitment in Autocracies and Democracies

Keefer, Philip

World Bank, Washington, DC

关键词: ARMED CONFLICT;    AUTOCRACY;    BARRIERS TO ENTRY;    CANDIDATES;    CITIZEN;   

DOI  :  10.1596/1813-9450-4185
RP-ID  :  WPS4185

学科分类：社会科学、人文和艺术（综合）

来源: World Bank Open Knowledge Repository

【 摘 要 】

This paper suggests a new factor thatmakes civil war more likely: the inability of politicalactors to make credible promises to broad segments ofsociety. Lacking this ability, both elected and unelectedgovernments pursue public policies that leave citizens lesswell-off and more prone to revolt. At the same time, theseactors have a reduced ability to build an anti-insurgencycapacity in the first place, since they are less able toprevent anti-insurgents from themselves mounting coups. Butwhile reducing the risk of conflict overall, increasingcredibility can, over some range, worsen the effects ofnatural resources and ethnic fragmentation on civil war.Empirical tests using various measures of politicalcredibility support these conclusions.