Bargaining for a New Fiscal Pactin Mexico

Webb, Steven B. ; Gonzalez, Christian Y.

World Bank, Washington, D.C.

关键词: FISCAL FEDERALISM;    FISCAL REFORMS;    TAXES;    VALUE ADDED TAXES;    STATE TAXES;   

DOI  :  10.1596/1813-9450-3284
RP-ID  :  WPS3284

学科分类：社会科学、人文和艺术（综合）

来源: World Bank Open Knowledge Repository

【 摘 要 】

The authors consider the malaise withthe present set-up of fiscal federalism in Mexico from thepoints of view of the main players-the federal government,the states, the municipalities, and the citizen voters-inorder to identify the areas of potential common interest aswell as the direct conflicts. There is a zero-sum game onsome issues, like the size of aggregate transfers, but noton others, like raising tax collection and improvingaccountability for service delivery. The authors considerbargain packages that combine mutually beneficial changesand thus might obtain broad enough political support. Theyanalyze the bargaining packages in two main tracks-oneconcerning tax assignments, revenue sharing, and taxadministration, and another concerning the conjunction ofearmarked transfers and accountability for serviceprovision. An important result is that almost all stateswould find it fiscally attractive to impose a sales tax thatreplaced part of the federal value-added tax (VAT), even ifthe federal government reduced revenue sharing enough tocover half the cost of reducing the VAT rate to make roomfor the state tax.