The Quality of Foreign Aid:Country Selectivity or Donors Incentives?

Wane, Waly

World Bank, Washington, D.C.

关键词: ACCOUNTABILITY;    AID;    AID AGENCIES;    AID ALLOCATION;    CORRUPTION;   

DOI  :  10.1596/1813-9450-3325
RP-ID  :  WPS3325

学科分类：社会科学、人文和艺术（综合）

来源: World Bank Open Knowledge Repository

【 摘 要 】

The author investigates the determinantsof foreign aid quality. He shows that design effects are acrucial component of quality. He thus establishes thatdonors have an impact on the quality of the foreignassistance they provide. The author also shows boththeoretically and empirically that the quality of aid isendogenous to the relationship between the donor agency andthe recipient government. Highly capable and accountablegovernments accept only well-designed projects, whereasgovernments with low accountability may accept poor qualityprojects either because they are unable to assess the worthof the projects or they will benefit personally.