Optimal Pre-Merger Notification Mechanisms : Incentives and Efficiency of Mandatory and Voluntary Schemes

Benitez, Daniel ; Gonzalez, Aldo

关键词: ACQUISITIONS;    ANTITRUST LAW;    ASSET VALUE;    COLLUSION;    COMPANY;   

DOI  :  10.1596/1813-9450-4936
RP-ID  :  WPS4936

学科分类：社会科学、人文和艺术（综合）

来源: World Bank Open Knowledge Repository

【 摘 要 】

The authors compare the two mergercontrol systems currently employed worldwide: a mandatorysystem based on merger size threshold and a voluntary systemwith ex-post monitoring and fines. The voluntary systempossesses two informational advantages: (i) the enforcementagency employs more information -verifiable and nonverifiable parameters- to decide the set of mergers toinvestigate, and (ii) the first move of merging firmsreveals useful information to the agency about thecompetitive risk of a merger. If fines for undue omission tonotify are upward limited, then a mixed mechanism isoptimal, where small transactions are under a voluntaryregime while the big mergers are obliged to report. Remediesfor fixing anticompetitive mergers act as an instrument thatinduces firms to notify the operation, improving further theadvantage of the voluntary mechanism.