Auctions with Endogenous Participation and Quality Thresholds : Evidence from ODA Infrastructure Procurement

Estache, Antonio ; Iimi, Atsushi

关键词: ADMINISTRATIVE COSTS;    AFFILIATED ORGANIZATIONS;    ANTI-CORRUPTION;    AUCTION;    AUCTION PROCESS;   

DOI  :  10.1596/1813-9450-4853
RP-ID  :  WPS4853

学科分类：社会科学、人文和艺术（综合）

来源: World Bank Open Knowledge Repository

【 摘 要 】

Infrastructure projects are oftentechnically complicated and highly customized. Therefore,procurement competition tends to be limited. Competition isthe single most important factor toward auction efficiencyand anti-corruption. However, the degree of competitionrealized is closely related to bidders' entry decisionand the auctioneer's decision on how to assesstechnical attributes in the bid evaluation process. Thispaper estimates the interactive effects among quality,entry, and competition. With data on procurement auctionsfor electricity projects in developing countries, it isfound that large electricity works are by nature costly andcan attract only a few participants. The limited competitionwould raise government procurement costs. In addition, hightechnical requirements are likely to be imposed for theselarge-scale projects, which will in turn add extra costs forthe better quality of works and further limit bidderparticipation. The evidence suggests that quality is ofparticular importance in large infrastructure projects andauctioneers cannot easily substitute price for quality.