Bidders’ Entry and Auctioneer’s Rejection : Applying a Double Selection Model to Road Procurement Auctions

Estache, Antonio ; Iimi, Atsushi

关键词: AFFILIATED;    AFFILIATED ORGANIZATIONS;    AUCTION;    AUCTION MARKETS;    AUCTION PROCESS;   

DOI  :  10.1596/1813-9450-4855
RP-ID  :  WPS4855

学科分类：社会科学、人文和艺术（综合）

来源: World Bank Open Knowledge Repository

【 摘 要 】

Limited competition has been a seriousconcern in infrastructure procurement. Importantly, however,there are normally a number of potential bidders initiallyshowing interest in proposed projects. This paper focuses ontackling the question why these initially interested biddersfade out. An empirical problem is that no bids of fading-outfirms are observable. They could decide not to enter theprocess at the beginning of the tendering or may betechnically disqualified at any point in the selectionprocess. This paper applies the double selection model toprocurement data from road development projects indeveloping countries and examines why competition ends uprestricted. It shows that bidders are self-selective andauctioneers also tend to limit participation depending onthe size of contracts. Therefore, limited competition wouldlikely lead to high infrastructure procurement costs.