Political Selection and Bureaucratic Productivity

Habyarimana, James ; Khemani, Stuti ; Scot, Thiago

World Bank, Washington, DC

关键词: BUREAUCRACY;    POLITICIANS;    PUBLIC SERVICES;    INTEGRITY;    STATE CAPACITY;   

DOI  :  10.1596/1813-9450-8673
RP-ID  :  WPS8673

学科分类：社会科学、人文和艺术（综合）

来源: World Bank Open Knowledge Repository

【 摘 要 】

Economic theory of public bureaucraciesas complex organizations predicts that bureaucraticproductivity can be shaped by the selection of differenttypes of agents, beyond their incentives. This theoryapplies to the institutions of local government in thedeveloping world, where nationally appointed bureaucrats andlocally elected politicians together manage theimplementation of public policies and the delivery ofservices. Yet, there is no evidence on whether (which)selection traits of these bureaucrats and politicians matterfor the productivity of local bureaucracies. This paperaddresses the empirical gap by gathering rich data in aninstitutional context of district governments in Uganda,which is typical of the local state in poor countries. Thepaper measures traits such as the integrity, altruism,personality, and public service motivation of bureaucratsand politicians. It finds robust evidence that higherintegrity among locally elected politicians is associatedwith substantively better delivery of public health servicesby district bureaucracies. Together with the theory, thisevidence suggests that policy makers seeking to build localstate capacity in poor countries should take politicalselection seriously.