The Consequences of Political Interference in Bureaucratic Decision Making : Evidence from Nigeria

Rogger, Daniel

World Bank, Washington, DC

关键词: POLITICIANS;    BUEAUCRATS;    PUBLIC GOODS;    DECENTRALIZATION;    POLITICAL INTERFERENCE;   

DOI  :  10.1596/1813-9450-8554
RP-ID  :  WPS8554

学科分类：社会科学、人文和艺术（综合）

来源: World Bank Open Knowledge Repository

【 摘 要 】

This paper investigates the consequencesof granting politicians power over bureaucrats in theimplementation of small-scale public infrastructureprojects. While potentially bolstering the incentive for theexecutive to perform, increased legislative oversight maylead to distortions in the technocratic process forpolitical gain. By assembling a nationally representativedata set from Nigeria that tracks public projects frominception to audit, the paper finds evidence of a cleartrade-off between political oversight and bureaucraticautonomy. Using an instrumental variables strategy in whichearly career choices of politicians are key determinants oflegislative committee membership, the analysis finds thatlegislative influence increases the likelihood that aproject is launched by 18 percent, but at the cost ofreducing project quality by 15 percent and increasing thereported misuse of funds. The results highlight thefundamental tension between bureaucratic inaction andpolitical corruption.