Sharing Oil Rents and Political Violence

Cordella, Tito ; Onder, Harun

World Bank, Washington, DC

关键词: natural resources;    conflict;    redistribution;    aggregative games;    oil windfalls;   

DOI  :  10.1596/1813-9450-7869
RP-ID  :  WPS7869

学科分类：社会科学、人文和艺术（综合）

来源: World Bank Open Knowledge Repository

【 摘 要 】

This paper investigates how thedevolution of oil windfalls affects the likelihood ofpolitical violence. It shows that transferring large sharesof oil wealth can prevent conflict, while transferring smallshares can trigger it. Among the different transfer schemes,fiscal transfers (to subnational governments) yield thehighest levels of consumption, but direct transfers (topeople) are the most effective in preventing conflict. Byaverting conflict, transfers can improve ex ante welfare;however, only a subset of the ex ante welfare optimaltransfers is optimal ex post and thus self-enforcing. Amongthem, those that avert conflict by reinforcing repressiveregimes are of particular policy interest.