On the Effects of Enforcement onIllegal Markets : Evidence from a Quasi-Experiment in Colombia

Mejí ; a, Daniel ; Restrepo, Pascual ; Rozo, Sandra V.

World Bank, Washington, DC

关键词: CHEMICALS;    POLICIES;    CROP;    COCA;    MILITARY;   

DOI  :  10.1596/1813-9450-7409
RP-ID  :  WPS7409

学科分类：社会科学、人文和艺术（综合）

来源: World Bank Open Knowledge Repository

【 摘 要 】

This paper studies the effects ofenforcement on illegal behavior in the context of a largeaerial spraying program designed to curb coca cultivation inColombia. In 2006, the Colombian government pledged not tospray a 10 km band around the frontier with Ecuador due todiplomatic frictions arising from the possibly negativecollateral effects of this policy on the Ecuadorian side ofthe border. This variation is used to estimate the effect ofspraying on coca cultivation by regression discontinuityaround the 10 km threshold and by conditional differences indifferences. The results suggest that spraying oneadditional hectare reduces coca cultivation by 0.022 to 0.03hectares; these effects are too small to make aerialspraying a cost-effective policy for reducing cocaineproduction in Colombia.