Was Weber Right? : The Effects of Pay for Ability and Pay for Performance on Pro-Social Motivation, Ability and Effort in the Public Sector

Banuri, Sheheryar ; Keefer, Philip

World Bank, Washington, DC

关键词: SKILLS;    EMPLOYMENT;    PUBLIC ADMINISTRATIONS;    E-MAIL;    RELIABILITY;   

DOI  :  10.1596/1813-9450-7261
RP-ID  :  WPS7261

学科分类：社会科学、人文和艺术（综合）

来源: World Bank Open Knowledge Repository

【 摘 要 】

This paper examines the effects ofpecuniary compensation on the ability and motivation ofindividuals in organizations with non-pecuniary orpro-social missions. In particular, the paper compares flatpay systems, unrelated with ability or effort, to two othersystems that are considered superior: high-powered, pay forperformance schemes and more traditional, “Weberian” schemesthat calibrate pay to ability, independent of effort. Theanalysis uses a sample of future public sector workers andfinds that all three pay schemes attract motivated workersinto tasks with a pro-social mission. However, flat payschemes also attract low ability workers. In the short run,pay-for-performance schemes generate higher effort than flatpay and pay-for-ability systems, a difference drivenentirely by effects on unmotivated workers. Once selectioneffects are accounted for, however, workers with pay forability and pay for performance exert statisticallyindistinguishable levels of effort in the pro-social task.Moreover, pay for ability elicits effort at lower cost thanpay for performance.