The role of opacity and transparency in achieving strategic stability in South Asia.

Rajain, Arpit (New Delhi, India) ; Ashraf, Tariq Mahmud (Islamabad, Pakistan)

Sandia National Laboratories

关键词: Pakistan;    Security;    99 General And Miscellaneous//Mathematics, Computing, And Information Science;    Monitoring;    Deterrence (Strategy);   

DOI  :  10.2172/974409
RP-ID  :  SAND2005-4957
RP-ID  :  AC04-94AL85000
RP-ID  :  974409

美国|英语

来源: UNT Digital Library

【 摘 要 】

According to international relations theory, deterrence can be used as a tool to achieve stability between potentially hostile nations. India and Pakistan's long history of periodic crises raises the question of how they can achieve deterrence stability. 'Transparency' describes the flow of information between parties and plays a key role in establishing a deterrence relationship. This paper studies the balance needed between opacity and transparency in nuclear topics for the maintenance of deterrence stability between India and Pakistan. States with nuclear weapons are postulated to implement transparency in four categories: potential, capability, intent, and resolve. The study applies these categories to the nuclear components of the ongoing India-Pakistan Composite Dialogue Working Group for Peace and Security including CBMs. To focus our efforts, we defined four scenarios to characterize representative strategic/military/political conditions. The scenarios are combinations of these two sets of opposite poles: competition - cooperation; extremism - moderation (to be understood primarily in a religious/nationalistic sense). We describe each scenario in terms of select focal areas (nuclear doctrine, nuclear command and control, nuclear stockpile, nuclear delivery/defensive systems, and conventional force posture). The scenarios help frame the realm of possibilities, and have been described in terms of expected conditions for the focal areas. We then use the conditions in each scenario to prescribe a range of information-sharing actions that the two countries could take to increase stability. We also highlight the information that should not be shared. These actions can be political (e.g., declarations), procedural (e.g., advance notice of certain military activities), or technologically based (e.g., seismic monitoring of the nuclear test moratorium).