Seismic Fragility of the LANL Fire Water Distribution System

Salmon, Greg Mertz Jason Cardon Mike

Los Alamos National Laboratory

关键词: Probability;    Storage;    Metallurgy;    Documentation;    Lanl;   

DOI  :  10.2172/901898
RP-ID  :  LA-14325
RP-ID  :  DE-AC52-06NA25396
RP-ID  :  901898

美国|英语

来源: UNT Digital Library

【 摘 要 】

The purpose of this report is to present the results of a site-wide system fragility assessment. This assessment focuses solely on the performance of the water distribution systems that supply Chemical and Metallurgy Research (CMR), Weapons Engineering and Tritium Facility (WETF), Radioactive Liquid Waste Treatment Facility (RLWTF), Waste Characterization, Reduction, Repackaging Facility (WCRRF), and Transuranic Waste Inspectable Storage Project (TWISP). The analysis methodology is based on the American Lifelines Alliance seismic fragility formulations for water systems. System fragilities are convolved with the 1995 LANL seismic hazards to develop failure frequencies. Acceptance is determined by comparing the failure frequencies to the DOE-1020 Performance Goals. This study concludes that: (1) If a significant number of existing isolation valves in the water distribution system are closed to dedicate the entire water system to fighting fires in specific nuclear facilities; (2) Then, the water distribution systems for WETF, RLWTF, WCRRF, and TWISP meet the PC-2 performance goal and the water distribution system for CMR is capable of surviving a 0.06g earthquake. A parametric study of the WETF water distribution system demonstrates that: (1) If a significant number of valves in the water distribution system are NOT closed to dedicate the entire water system to fighting fires in WETF; (2) Then, the water distribution system for WETF has an annual probability of failure on the order of 4 x 10{sup -3} that does not meet the PC-2 performance goal. Similar conclusions are expected for CMR, RLWTF, WCRRF, and TWISP. It is important to note that some of the assumptions made in deriving the results should be verified by personnel in the safety-basis office and may need to be incorporated in technical surveillance requirements in the existing authorization basis documentation if credit for availability of fire protection water is taken at the PC-2 level earthquake levels. Assumptions are presented in Section 2.2 of this report.