North Korea's nuclear weapons program:verification priorities and new challenges.

Moon, Duk-ho (Korean Consulate General in New York)

Sandia National Laboratories

关键词: Nuclear Arms Control-Verification.;    Weapons Arms Control-Verification.;    Reprocessing;    Iaea;    Isotope Separation;   

DOI  :  10.2172/876296
RP-ID  :  SAND2003-4558
RP-ID  :  AC04-94AL85000
RP-ID  :  876296

美国|英语

来源: UNT Digital Library

【 摘 要 】

A comprehensive settlement of the North Korean nuclear issue may involve military, economic, political, and diplomatic components, many of which will require verification to ensure reciprocal implementation. This paper sets out potential verification methodologies that might address a wide range of objectives. The inspection requirements set by the International Atomic Energy Agency form the foundation, first as defined at the time of the Agreed Framework in 1994, and now as modified by the events since revelation of the North Korean uranium enrichment program in October 2002. In addition, refreezing the reprocessing facility and 5 MWe reactor, taking possession of possible weapons components and destroying weaponization capabilities add many new verification tasks. The paper also considers several measures for the short-term freezing of the North's nuclear weapon program during the process of negotiations, should that process be protracted. New inspection technologies and monitoring tools are applicable to North Korean facilities and may offer improved approaches over those envisioned just a few years ago. These are noted, and potential bilateral and regional verification regimes are examined.