COST OF ADDRESSING TARGETS OF UNEQUAL VALUE

CANAVAN, G.H.

Los Alamos National Laboratory

关键词: Missiles;    Stability;    99 General And Miscellaneous//Mathematics, Computing, And Information Science;    Targets;    04 Oil Shales And Tar Sands;   

DOI  :  10.2172/784487
RP-ID  :  LA-UR-01-4561
RP-ID  :  W-7405-ENG-36
RP-ID  :  784487

美国|英语

来源: UNT Digital Library

【 摘 要 】

The formalism for evaluating first strike costs and incentives for military targeting generalize to include higher value targets. That introduces two new allocations to the usual allocation between missiles and military targets, but they can be performed analytically. As the number of weapons on each side decreases, the optimal fraction of second strike weapons allocated to military values falls. The shift to high value targets is more pronounced below about 1,000 weapons for nominal parameters. Below 500 weapons the first striker's cost of action drops below its cost of inaction. A strike would induce a second strike of about 250 weapons on high value targets. An increase in the first striker's preference for damage to the other's high value targets increases or a decrease in its preference for preventing damage to its own high value targets decreases first strike costs and stability margins. Including defenses complicates allocations slightly. The main effect is increased attrition of second strikes, particularly at larger defenses, which makes it possible to significantly reduce damage to high value targets. At 1,000 weapons, by 300 to 400 interceptors the first striker's costs are reduced to 30% below that of inaction and the number of weapons delivered on the first striker's high value targets is reduced to about 100.