Managing the Principal Agent Problem in Bolsa Familia: A look at contextual factors that affect the quality of implementation

Christian van Stolk ; Sunil Patil

RAND Corporation

RAND Corporation

关键词: Economic Development;    Social Services and Welfare;    Personal Finance;    Public Sector Governance;    Brazil;    Poverty;   

DOI  :  10.7249/RR1617
RP-ID  :  RR-1617-ESRC

学科分类：自然科学（综合）

美国|英语

来源: RAND Corporation Published Research

【 摘 要 】

Bolsa Familia (BF) is a conditional cash transfer programme introduced in 2003 in Brazil. This report aims to understand the principal agent problem in BF. We do this by running three generalised linear models to find associations between contextual factors such as capacity of agents against outcome measures related to the quality of the provision of services such as the quality of registries. Our findings suggest that those implementing services must have a clear incentive in the programme either through the provision of support under the programme or through the accountability process. Smaller municipalities and those with poorer constituencies tend to have more accurate registries. Health and education services seem to have less incentive to operate in BF as they have no electoral incentive or receive support under BF. Finally, our models show that more integration between BF and health and education services is associated with better reported implementation.