Inferring the True Likelihood of Task Completion by Others

Aperjis, Christina ; Huberman, Bernardo ; Wang, Jing

HP Development Company

关键词: human factors;    economics;    experimentation;    incentive mechanism;    truth-telling;    risk attitudes;   

RP-ID  :  HPL-2013-82

学科分类：计算机科学（综合）

美国|英语

来源: HP Labs

【 摘 要 】

Both in online labor markets and within enterprises, a worker often has better information than his employer about the likelihood of completing a task or project on time. This information asymmetry prevents managers from having accurate estimates of project completion times. We design and experimentally test an incentive mechanism which induces workers to reveal their true likelihoods of completion times while minimizing the expected payments by the employers. Our results show that our mechanism performs verywell at the aggregate level.