Designing an Incentive Contract Menu for Sustaining the Electricity Market

Energies

Ying Yu¹  Tongdan Jin²  Chunjie Zhong¹ 

[1] School of Mechatronics Engineering and Automation, Shanghai University, Shanghai 200072, China;Ingram School of Engineering, Texas State University, San Marcos, TX 78666, USA;

关键词: stackelberg game;    Q-learning;    multi-agent simulation;    electricity market;    incentive mechanism;   

DOI  :  10.3390/en81212419

来源: mdpi

【 摘 要 】

This paper designs an incentive contract menu to achieve long-term stability for electricity prices in a day-ahead electricity market. A bi-level Stackelberg game model is proposed to search for the optimal incentive mechanism under a one-leader and multi-followers gaming framework. A multi-agent simulation platform was developed to investigate the effectiveness of the incentive mechanism using an independent system operator (ISO) and multiple power generating companies (GenCos). Further, a Q-learning approach was implemented to analyze and assess the response of GenCos to the incentive menu. Numerical examples are provided to demonstrate the effectiveness of the incentive contract.

【 授权许可】

CC BY   
© 2015 by the authors; licensee MDPI, Basel, Switzerland.