Facility Safeguardability Analysis In Support of Safeguards-by-Design

Philip Casey Durst ; Roald Wigeland ; Robert Bari ; Trond Bjornard ; John Hockert ; Michael Zentner

关键词: CONSTRUCTION;    COST OVERRUNS;    DESIGN;    DOMESTIC SAFEGUARDS;    EVALUATION;    FSC APPROXIMATION;    IAEA;    NUCLEAR FACILITIES;    PHYSICAL PROTECTION;    PROLIFERATION;    SAFEGUARDS;    THEFT Safeguardability;    Safegua;   

DOI  :  10.2172/993547
RP-ID  :  INL/EXT-10-18751
PID  :  OSTI ID: 993547
Others  :  TRN: US1008143

美国|英语

来源: SciTech Connect

【 摘 要 】

The following report proposes the use of Facility Safeguardability Analysis (FSA) to: i) compare and evaluate nuclear safeguards measures, ii) optimize the prospective facility safeguards approach, iii) objectively and analytically evaluate nuclear facility safeguardability, and iv) evaluate and optimize barriers within the facility and process design to minimize the risk of diversion and theft of nuclear material. As proposed by the authors, Facility Safeguardability Analysis would be used by the Facility Designer and/or Project Design Team during the design and construction of the nuclear facility to evaluate and optimize the facility safeguards approach and design of the safeguards system. Through a process of ???Safeguards-by-Design??? (SBD), this would be done at the earliest stages of project conceptual design and would involve domestic and international nuclear regulators and authorities, including the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). The benefits of the Safeguards-by-Design approach is that it would clarify at a very early stage the international and domestic safeguards requirements for the Construction Project Team, and the best design and operating practices for meeting these requirements. It would also minimize the risk to the construction project, in terms of cost overruns or delays, which might otherwise occur if the nuclear safeguards measures are not incorporated into the facility design at an early stage. Incorporating nuclear safeguards measures is straight forward for nuclear facilities of existing design, but becomes more challenging with new designs and more complex nuclear facilities. For this reason, the facility designer and Project Design Team require an analytical tool for comparing safeguards measures, options, and approaches, and for evaluating the ???safeguardability??? of the facility. The report explains how preliminary diversion path analysis and the Proliferation Resistance and Physical Protection (PRPP) evaluation methodology can be adapted for evaluating and assessing the safeguardability of nuclear facilities ??? both existing, as well as those still on the drawing board. The advantages of the Facility Safeguardability Analysis is that it would not only give the facility designer an analytical method for evaluating and assessing the safeguards measures and approaches for the prospective facility, but also the ability to optimize the design of the facility process for enhancing facility safeguardability. The following report explains the need for Facility Safeguardability Analysis and explains how it could be used in the Safeguards-by-Design, in support of the design and construction of nuclear facilities.