Co-evolution of pre-play signaling and cooperation

JOURNAL OF THEORETICAL BIOLOGY

卷:274

Article

Santos, Francisco C.^1,2,3  Pacheco, Jorge M.^3,4  Skyrms, Brian⁵ 

[1] Univ Nova Lisboa, Fac Ciencias & Tecnol, CENTRIA, P-2829516 Quinta Da Torre, Caparica, Portugal

[2] Univ Nova Lisboa, Fac Ciencias & Tecnol, Dept Informat, P-2829516 Quinta Da Torre, Caparica, Portugal

[3] CMAF, ATP Grp, P-1649003 Lisbon, Portugal

[4] Univ Minho, Dept Matemat & Aplicacoes, P-4710057 Braga, Portugal

[5] Univ Calif Irvine, Sch Social Sci, Irvine, CA 92612 USA

关键词: Evolution;    Cooperation;    Coordination;    Collective action;    Signaling;   

DOI  :  10.1016/j.jtbi.2011.01.004

来源: Elsevier

【 摘 要 】

A finite-population dynamic evolutionary model is presented, which shows that increasing the individual capacity of sending pre-play signals (without any pre-defined meaning), opens a route for cooperation. The population dynamics leads individuals to discriminate between different signals and react accordingly to the signals received. The proportion of time that the population spends in different states can be calculated analytically. We show that increasing the number of different signals benefits cooperative strategies, illustrating how cooperators may take profit from a diverse signaling portfolio to forecast future behaviors and avoid being cheated by defectors. (C) 2011 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

【 授权许可】

Free