The impact of truncation selection and diffusion on cooperation in spatial games

JOURNAL OF THEORETICAL BIOLOGY

卷:466

Article

Morsky, Bryce^1,2,3  Bauch, Chris T.⁴ 

[1] Univ Guelph, Dept Math & Stat, 50 Stone Rd East,Room 437,MacNaughton Bldg, Guelph, ON N1G 2W1, Canada

[2] Univ Notre Dame, Dept Phys, Nieuwland Sci Hall, Notre Dame, IN 46556 USA

[3] Univ Penn, Dept Biol, Carolyn Lynch Lab, Philadelphia, PA 19104 USA

[4] Univ Waterloo, Dept Appl Math, 200 Univ Ave West, Waterloo, ON N2L 3G1, Canada

关键词: Cooperation;    Replicator dynamics;    Spatial games;    Truncation selection;   

DOI  :  10.1016/j.jtbi.2019.01.023

来源: Elsevier

【 摘 要 】

Natural Selection is frequently modelled via proportional selection where survival is proportional to the average payoff differential. There has been little attention devoted to modelling truncation selection where replicators below a threshold are culled and survivors reproduce. Here, we systematically explore truncation selection for two strategy games in a spatial setting. We employ two variations of truncation selection: independent, where the threshold is fixed; and dependent, where the proportion culled is fixed. Further, we explore the effects of diffusion with the algorithms: contest-diffusion-offspring (CDO), and diffusion-contest-offspring (DCO). CDO and DCO frequently facilitate and diminish cooperation, respectively. For independent truncation, there are three qualitative regimes determined by the payoff threshold: cooperation decreases as the threshold rises; polymorphisms are stable; and extinction is frequent. Further, an intermediate payoff to cooperators playing defectors can maximize cooperation for the DCO algorithm with a high payoff threshold. Dependent truncation affects games differently; lower levels reduce cooperation for the Hawk Dove game and increase it for the Stag Hunt, and higher levels produce the opposite effects. Comparing these truncation methods to proportional selection, we show how they impact the prevalence of cooperation. (C) 2019 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

【 授权许可】

Free