Metrology and Measurement Systems | |
Current Injection Attack against the KLJN Secure Key Exchange | |
Chen Hsien-Pu1  Mohammad Muneer1  Kish Laszlo B.1  | |
[1] Texas A; | |
关键词: KLJN; current injection attack; secure key exchange; unconditional security; privacy amplification; | |
DOI : 10.1515/mms-2016-0025 | |
来源: DOAJ |
【 摘 要 】
The Kirchhoff-law-Johnson-noise (KLJN) scheme is a statistical/physical secure key exchange system based on the laws of classical statistical physics to provide unconditional security. We used the LTSPICE industrial cable and circuit simulator to emulate one of the major active (invasive) attacks, the current injection attack, against the ideal and a practical KLJN system, respectively. We show that two security enhancement techniques, namely, the instantaneous voltage/current comparison method, and a simple privacy amplification scheme, independently and effectively eliminate the information leak and successfully preserve the system’s unconditional security.
【 授权许可】
Unknown