Cable Capacitance Attack against the KLJN Secure Key Exchange

Information

Hsien-Pu Chen¹  Elias Gonzalez¹  Yessica Saez¹  Laszlo B. Kish²  Qiong Huang² 

[1] Department of Electrical and Computer Engineering, Texas A & M University, 3128 TAMU, College Station, TX 77843, USA;

关键词: KLJN;    cable capacitance attack;    capacitor killer;    secure key exchange;    unconditional security;    privacy amplification;   

DOI  :  10.3390/info6040719

来源: mdpi

【 摘 要 】

The security of the Kirchhoff-law-Johnson-(like)-noise (KLJN) key exchange system is based on the fluctuation-dissipation theorem of classical statistical physics. Similarly to quantum key distribution, in practical situations, due to the non-idealities of the building elements, there is a small information leak, which can be mitigated by privacy amplification or other techniques so that unconditional (information-theoretic) security is preserved. In this paper, the industrial cable and circuit simulator LTSPICE is used to validate the information leak due to one of the non-idealities in KLJN, the parasitic (cable) capacitance. Simulation results show that privacy amplification and/or capacitor killer (capacitance compensation) arrangements can effectively eliminate the leak.

【 授权许可】

CC BY   
© 2015 by the authors; licensee MDPI, Basel, Switzerland.