Defending the Good Dog Picture of Virtues

Organon F

Andrei Ionuţ Mărăşoiu¹ 

[1] Institutul de Cercetare al Universității din București (ICUB);

关键词: experience;    expertise;    fluency;    intellectual virtue;    moral virtue;    necessitation;    normativity;    rationality;    reflection;   

DOI  :  https://doi.org/10.31577/orgf.2020.27408

来源: DOAJ

【 摘 要 】

I consider and reject a specific criticism advanced by Korsgaard against virtue ethics and epistemology when these are conceived with the help of what she calls the image of the “Good Dog.” I consider what virtue ethics and epistemology would look like if the Good Dog picture of virtues were largely correct. I argue that attention to the features that make Korsgaard undermine the usefulness of virtues when conceived along the lines of the Good Dog picture reveals the opposite of what she claims. On the Good Dog picture, virtue ethics and epistemology are seen as more promising approaches to rationality than Korsgaard’s own advocacy of reflection.

【 授权许可】

Unknown