Horizon-K Farsightedness in Criminal Networks

Games

卷:12

Ana Mauleon¹  Vincent Vannetelbosch²  P. Jean-Jacques Herings³ 

[1] CEREC, UCLouvain Saint-Louis, 1000 Brussels, Belgium;

[2] CORE, UCLouvain, 1348 Louvain-la-Neuve, Belgium;

[3] Department of Economics, Maastricht University, 6200 MD Maastricht, The Netherlands;

关键词: limited farsightedness;    stability;    criminal networks;   

DOI  :  10.3390/g12030056

来源: DOAJ

【 摘 要 】

We study the criminal networks that will emerge in the long run when criminals are neither myopic nor completely farsighted but have some limited degree of farsightedness. We adopt the horizon-K farsighted set to answer this question. We find that in criminal networks with n criminals, the set consisting of the complete network is a horizon-K farsighted set whenever the degree of farsightedness of the criminals is larger than or equal to $(n-1)$. Moreover, the complete network is the unique horizon-$(n-1)$ farsighted set. Hence, the predictions obtained in case of completely farsighted criminals still hold when criminals are much less farsighted.

【 授权许可】

Unknown