Revista de Economia Política | |
Political economy of preferential trade agreement: the case of bilateral asymmetric negotiation | |
Daniel Augusto Motta1  | |
[1] ,USP IPE | |
关键词: FTAA; political economy; bargaining; non-cooperative games; | |
DOI : 10.1590/S0101-31572007000200003 | |
来源: SciELO | |
【 摘 要 】
The purpose of this paper is to analyse the political economy of preferential trade agreements based on a sequential non-cooperative Stackelberg political game between a large economy and a small one, in which the political dispute of rival lobby groups defines the unilateral stance of both governments in the first stage; and the Stackelberg "coalition-proof" equilibrium defines the free trade agreement format in the second stage. Finally, a few modifications in the initial game structure are discussed in order to enhance the small economy's negotiation power. The political economy model is applied to FTAA case.
【 授权许可】
CC BY
All the contents of this journal, except where otherwise noted, is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution License
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