期刊论文详细信息
International Journal Of The Commons | |
Anticommons, the Coase Theorem and the problem of bundling inefficiency | |
Ronald King1  Cosmin Marian2  Ivan Major3  | |
[1] Department of Political Science, San Diego State University, USA;Faculty of Political, Administrative and Communication Sciences, BabeInstitute of Economics, CERS, Hungarian Academy of SciencesBudapest University of Technology and Economics, Hungary | |
关键词: Anticommons; bundling agreements; Coase theorem; complementary property rights; non-cooperative games; rational tragedies; | |
DOI : 10.18352/ijc.614 | |
学科分类:环境科学(综合) | |
来源: The International Association For The Study Of The Commons | |
【 摘 要 】
The Coase theorem is most often formulated in terms of bi-lateral monopoly, for instance between a polluting factory and an affected neighbour. Instead, we introduce multiple affected neighbours and the concept of anticommons, in which auto
【 授权许可】
CC BY-NC
【 预 览 】
Files | Size | Format | View |
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RO201909020215127ZK.pdf | 139KB | download |